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CHAPTER
Adequacy of the Weekly 
Benefit Amount
Christopher J. O'Leary




The unemployment insurance (UI) system was established to allevi 
ate the distress and hardship caused by involuntary unemployment. 
Through weekly benefit payments to eligible claimants, the system 
helps maintain living standards during active job search. The adequacy 
of the weekly benefit amount in performing the income maintenance 
function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income that benefits 
replace. More directly, adequacy depends on how the weekly benefit 
contributes to maintaining usual levels of household expenditure.
When the federal-state UI system was established in the depths of 
the Great Depression, benefit levels were set at amounts widely 
regarded as adequate in terms of income replacement. Due to rapidly 
rising wage levels, by the end of World War II, UI benefit levels came 
to be viewed as inadequate. Since that time there has been continuing 
controversy over what the level of benefits should be and how the sys 
tem should operate to provide these benefits.
Criticisms—that benefits are either inadequate or excessive—regu 
larly surface during legislative considerations of benefit changes at 
both federal and state levels. Advocates of more generous benefits as 
well as proponents of benefit cutbacks can usually find support for
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their cause from research studies conducted over the years. During the 
1950s and 1970s, benefit adequacy studies indicated that benefit ceil 
ings were too low to allow many unemployed workers, particularly 
those with dependents, to meet basic expenses. On the other hand, 
studies of claimant job search behavior done over the past twenty years 
have focused on how the mere availability of unemployment benefits 
tends to cause substantial numbers of claimants to delay their return to 
work. Much of the history of the program, at both federal and state lev 
els, reflects efforts to resolve in one way or another the inherent con 
flict in the UI program's main objective of providing adequate income 
replacement.
Over the years, a widely held view has formed that the weekly bene 
fit amount should be high enough to sustain a worker and family with 
out their having to resort to public welfare assistance, but that benefits 
should not be so high as to undermine the incentive to return to work. 
There has been little agreement on the specifics of how this principle 
should be implemented. For example, there is concurrence that the 
benefit should be wage related, but states differ widely in how they 
measure past wages, the amount of wages to be replaced by the bene 
fits, and the highest amount of benefits that should be payable. There is 
disagreement also on such issues as to whether the benefit should rep 
resent a higher percentage of the wages of lower-paid workers and 
whether benefits should be increased for claimants who have depen 
dents. These issues are the subject of this chapter.
The Right to Unemployment Benefits
The UI system was designed to be completely separate from depres 
sion-era relief programs, with eligibility determined by labor force 
attachment and benefit levels based on prior earnings experience. No 
stigma is related to the receipt of UI, which provides "compensation 
for wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch . . . during 
periods of involuntary unemployment due to lack of work" (Blaustein 
1993, p. 47).
UI presumes need due to the economic loss resulting from unem 
ployment, while general relief programs require demonstration of need 
often to include the shedding of personal assets. The idea of basing 
benefits on demonstrated need was rejected at the outset so as to pre-
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serve the dignity of workers who find themselves in financial distress 
due to involuntary job loss, and to maintain the insurance nature of the 
program.
It may be that UI would generate less controversy if the objectives 
of the benefit amount were to relieve instead of to prevent poverty; if 
benefits were payable only to those unemployed who were clearly in 
need; and if the benefit amount were based on a calculated minimum 
budget somewhat above the poverty level for specific family sizes. On 
the other hand, one of the strengths of the UI system, which has gener 
ated widespread support, is the potential availability of benefits to vir 
tually all workers who face the risk of layoff.
Federal law has been regularly interpreted as prohibiting states from 
establishing an income or means test as a condition for benefits. 1 
Numerous state proposals to base benefits on factors other than unem 
ployment and claimants' past work and wage experience have been 
successfully challenged as violative of the federal prohibition against 
using unemployment funds for purposes other than to pay "compensa 
tion," defined in federal law as cash payments (solely) with respect to 
unemployment (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, pp. 84-87).
For example, proposals to require a longer waiting period for claim 
ants with base-period earnings in excess of a specified amount have 
been rejected as introducing an element of need even though no means 
test was involved. A similar reaction awaited a variety of other propos 
als to introduce elements other than work experience as a basis for ben 
efits: to establish stiffer qualifying requirements for claimants with 
working spouses; to reduce the severity of disqualifications for claim 
ants with dependents; to increase benefits for individuals who are their 
family's principal support; to establish a schedule of lower benefits 
payable to higher-wage claimants.
A change from a program of wage-related benefits, payable as a 
matter of right without a means or income test, to a needs-based pro 
gram would sacrifice a principle that is still vital to many. It would also 
alter a basic UI objective—from preventing poverty to alleviating pov 
erty.
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Wage-Related Benefits
Ideally, unemployment benefits should be sufficient to provide for a 
worker and family during a period of temporary unemployment with 
out requiring drastic cuts in their standard of living. Since income and 
living standards vary widely among workers, an identical benefit 
amount for everyone would be too high in relation to some claimants' 
living standards and wholly inadequate for others. Nor is it a practical 
alternative simply to key each worker's benefit directly to the level of 
those expenditures that constitute the individual's living standard.
Ordinarily, living standards are established by income levels, which 
depend in most cases on earnings from employment. Therefore, a ben 
efit amount directly related to wages will usually be related also to liv 
ing standards. Moreover, a wage-related benefit reinforces the concept 
that UI is an earned right, based on contributions required by law to be 
paid by the worker's employer as "insurance premiums" against the 
risk of unemployment. A wage-related benefit will not improve a low 
standard of living caused by low income. The benefits merely support 
whatever standard of living was established by the claimant's wages. 
The benefits will also not support a sumptuous living standard created 
by a high income. Since UI is a social insurance program with the fun 
damental social aim of preventing widespread poverty, UI maximum 
benefit rates are imposed in all states to conserve funds so as to spread 
resources as widely as is practical.
There has never been much controversy in the United States over 
tying benefits to prior earnings. This practice is at odds with the eighty- 
year British custom of paying aflat rate benefit to all eligible claim 
ants. This distinction is particularly surprising since so much else was 
borrowed from the British system. A flat rate for all has certain advan 
tages. It can be keyed to an objectively established subsistence level— 
or accommodate any other objective desired; it is relatively simple to 
administer, easily adjustable, predictable, and easy to understand. It 
requires no means test, and it ensures an income floor for all unem 
ployed who qualify.
The United States, and most other countries with UI systems, chose 
a different route. In every state in the nation, the amount of the weekly 
unemployment benefit is related to the unemployed worker's former 
wage. A uniform flat benefit for all recipients, regardless of the level at
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which it was set, was never considered feasible for the United States. 
This was partly because wage-related benefit precedents had been 
established, particularly in Wisconsin, but also because substantial 
regional, interstate, and area wage variations precluded the establish 
ment of a flat sum that would be adequate, by any measure, for even a 
majority of beneficiaries. The flat benefit is also inappropriate where 
wage levels vary greatly within the same locality.
Replacing One-Half of Lost Wages
Since the beginning of the federal-state UI program in the United 
States, there has been general acceptance of the idea that the weekly 
benefit should replace one-half of the worker's lost weekly wages. 
There is little historical evidence concerning the 50 percent concept, 
but it appears that the idea initially became established primarily 
through the influence of the first UI law in Wisconsin. 2 Preliminary 
versions of the Wisconsin statute called for a flat-rate benefit, but, in 
the early 1930s, the idea of a wage-related benefit evolved. The only 
antecedent offering guidance about the rate of wage replacement was 
the workers' compensation program, wherein two-thirds of former 
earnings were usually replaced. While this seemed reasonable for 
workers who had lost the physical capacity to work, it was viewed as 
excessive for those required to be able and available for work. Further 
more, it was feared that two-thirds wage replacement would substan 
tially diminish the incentive to actively seek work. One-half wage 
replacement was chosen as the natural alternative; the ratio was also 
selected because it was easy to understand and administer. 3 The Com 
mittee on Economic Security (1935) and the Social Security Board 
(1936) both recommended that benefits replace one-half of full-time 
weekly earnings. By 1938, all states had benefit rules that applied this 
principle.
The ratio suggested by the Social Security Board (1938) for consid 
eration by the states was 50 percent of the unemployed worker's full- 
time weekly earnings. Reports on full-time wages were difficult to 
obtain from employers, particularly for workers with variable work and 
pay patterns. For this and other reasons, states increasingly began to 
approximate weekly wages on the basis of quarterly wage data. A few 
states have implemented an annual wage formula, which makes the
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weekly benefit a percentage of annual wages and thus departs entirely 
from a weekly wage-based benefit.
Most states now set the weekly benefit as a fraction of the claimant's 
earnings in the high quarter or two highest quarters of the base period 
in which the claimant earned the most. Most high-quarter formulas 
apply the 50 percent wage replacement concept by establishing the 
weekly benefit amount as half of 1/13 of the earnings of that quarter (or 
1/26 of the high-quarter wages) on the assumption that the high quarter 
reflects full-time employment for all 13 weeks of the quarter.
While the principle of replacing 50 percent of lost wages has been 
widely accepted, many states now approximate a slightly different 
replacement rate. Currently, several states provide a basic weekly ben 
efit amount equal to over 54 percent (1/24 or more of high-quarter 
wages), and a few states provide under 50 percent—not counting the 
states using the annual wage formula.
Some benefit formulas are weighted in favor of lower-paid workers. 
These workers' weekly benefits represent a higher percentage of their 
normal wages than do benefits payable to higher-wage workers. This is 
based on the idea that lower-paid workers generally spend a greater 
proportion of their income for necessaries than do others. Other states 
pay allowances for claimants' dependents, thereby also deviating from 
the 50 percent rule. The ceiling all states put on the weekly benefit 
amount is another exception to the 50 percent rule.
One-Half for Four-Fifths
The percentage of the beneficiary population eligible for one-half 
wage replacement depends on the level of the benefit maximum. In his 
January 1954 Economic Report to Congress, President Eisenhower 
recommended
that the states raise the dollar maximums so that the payments to 
the great majority of the beneficiaries may equal at least half their 
regular earnings (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 180).
Soon thereafter, the goal was stated more clearly by the Federal 
Advisory Council on Employment Security which recommended that 
the maximum should be from 60 percent to 67 percent of the statewide 
average weekly wage. This was based on an estimate by Professor 
Richard Lester of Princeton University that the maximums in the origi-
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nal state laws would have been the equivalent of from three-fifths to 
two-thirds of average weekly wages in manufacturing in 1939. In that 
year, only 25.8 percent of claimants received the maximum benefit 
amount, indicating that the great majority of beneficiaries received 50 
percent wage replacement.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations recommended a benefit 
standard in their legislative proposals for UI, including a maximum 
weekly benefit equal to at least two-thirds of the statewide average 
weekly wage in covered employment. The same two-thirds recommen 
dation was included in the Nixon administration's 1973 UI proposals, 
on the grounds that this would meet the goal of providing "at least 
four-fifths of the Nation's insured workforce half-pay or better when 
unemployed" (Becker 1980, p. 4).
Evidence on Wage Replacement Standards
From the earliest days of UI in the United States, there has been a 
presumption that if half of lost wages were replaced there would be the 
right balance between compensation for lost income and the incentive 
for return to work. This section begins with a review of the fraction of 
lost wages that has actually been replaced by the UI system on average 
over the years. This is followed by a review of constructive studies of 
benefit adequacy that have been done to estimate the appropriate level 
of wage replacement. The research is divided into five groups: house 
hold expenditure studies that estimate the spending habits of families 
at risk of unemployment, optimal UI studies that mathematically 
model ideal UI systems, consumption smoothing studies that examine 
the degree to which household spending patterns change due to unem 
ployment, compensating wage differentials studies that analyze how 
wages differ depending on the risk of unemployment, and finally stud 
ies of what full unemployment compensation would be based on the 
economic theory of choice by the consumer-worker.
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Aggregate Wage Replacement Ratios
While most states have benefit formulas intended to replace approx 
imately one-half of lost wages, the maximum on payments guarantees 
that many high-wage workers will receive less than half their average 
lost earnings, and the minimum means that some low-wage workers 
may receive more than half their average earnings. The data in table 5.1 
summarize the national historical experience on benefit adequacy using 
a very aggregate measure—the average wage replacement ratio 




where WBAj = the weekly benefit amount received by the ith UI recip 
ient, n = the number of UI recipients, WEj = the weekly earnings of the 
jth covered worker, and m = the number of workers covered by UI.
In the first few years of UI, earnings of covered workers were quite 
low, the WRR was quite high, and there was little controversy about 
the adequacy of the weekly benefit amount. Leading up to U.S. 
involvement in World War II, average weekly wages of UI covered 
workers gradually rose, causing the WRR to fall. This continued until 
1945 when the WRR spiked up to reach 0.416 when first UI payments 
jumped from only half a million the previous year to over 2.8 million. 
In 1945, as the first postwar transition layoffs occurred among the aver 
age base-period earnings of claimants was dramatically higher for dis 
placed workers with recent histories of high wages and long hours. 
Following this, as figure 5.1 shows, the WRR trended downward 
through the early 1950s. Since that time, the WRR has ranged between 
32 and 37 percent, being approximately 36 percent in recent years.
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Table 5.1 Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) in Dollars






















































































































































































SOURCE. U.S Department of Labor (1992). Figures for 1993 and 1994 averaged from the four 
quarterly issues of UI Data Summary, U.S Department of Labor.
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Figure 5.1 also shows a general upward trend in the WRR since 
about 1950. Controlling for the changing occupational mix of UI 
claimants, Right (1980) arrived at lower bound estimates of a 0.10 to 
0.29 percent increase in the WRR per year over the 1950-1977 period. 
He concluded that there have been some real gains in adequacy over 
these years. Table 5.2 lists the WRR for each state in 1994. While the 
national WRR was 36.05 percent in 1995, WRRs across the states 
ranged from a low of 26.1 percent in California to a high of 52.8 per 
cent in Hawaii. A total of fifteen states had WRRs greater than 40 per 
cent in 1995.
Presumably, the WRR is used as a rough gauge of benefit adequacy 
because the data needed to compute it are readily available. It is the 
main measure of benefit adequacy regularly reported by the U.S. 
Department of Labor.4 However, the WRR as computed by the preced 
ing formula is a bit misleading. The denominator in the WRR considers 
wages for the entire population of covered workers, while the numera 
tor considers only payments to beneficiaries. Properly, we should exam 
ine benefit payments relative to lost earnings of beneficiaries.
Vroman (1980), who provided a comprehensive review of possible 
wage replacement rate computations, called the series presented in fig 
ure 5.1 and tables 5.1 and 5.2 a "gross narrow wage replacement ratio." 
Vroman (1980, p. 170) also cited criticism that the measure underesti 
mates the "true" replacement ratio because "unemployed workers 
receive lower wages than the average worker covered by the program." 
Using unpublished micro data on the actual pre-unemployment earn 
ings of beneficiaries from Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin for various periods during the 1980s, the 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 138) 
estimated that the gross narrow wage replacement ratio understates the 
actual replacement rates by 25 to 30 percentage points.
The dramatic difference in wage replacement ratio estimates 
computed by the rather misleading gross narrow WRR formula and 
those produced using micro data on actual benefits and prior earnings 
convinced the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(1995, p. 21) to recommend the following:
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the 


































































Table 5.2 State Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR), 1995
State Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (MaxWBA) in dollars, 
January 1996 
Max WBA as a Fraction of State Average Weekly Wage
(AWW), 1996 





































































































































































































































































SOURCE- U S. Department of Labor (1995a and 1995b)
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ment Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated by 
dividing the weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average 
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment 
(1995, p. 21). 5
Vroman (1980, pp. 170-172) reported that some researchers using 
micro data have arrived at very high net WRR figures. Feldstein 
(1974), who was concerned with the adverse incentive effects of UI, 
estimated that the net wage replacement ratio is often more than 70 
percent. Munts and Garfinkel (1974) found replacement rates in Ohio 
in 1971-1972 to range from 0.38 to 0.89 for several distinct types of 
family units. Corson et al. (1977) determined the average ratio of ben 
efits to lost wages in 1977 to be 0.66.
However, when broader measures of macro wage replacement that 
consider uncovered workers and noncompensated weeks are com 
puted, replacement rates are much lower. For example, Gramlich 
(1974) found that during the 1970-1971 recession, UI replaced only 6 
to 8 percent of lost earnings for families headed by men, and 14 to 18 
percent for families headed by women. While the gross narrow WRR 
for 1971 was 0.363, Edgell and Wandner (1974) estimated the macro 
replacement rate for UI in the U.S. economy to be as low as 20 percent.
The wage replacement ratio estimates produced in the 1970s also 
varied because of differential treatment of taxes in the computations. 
This was a very important issue prior to the 1986 federal income tax 
changes that placed income received as unemployment compensation 
benefits in the same tax category as income from labor earnings.
Household Expenditure Studies
The adequacy of a wage-related benefit is difficult to measure. The 
unemployment benefit does not guarantee anyone an adequate mini 
mum standard of living: it provides partial wage replacement. The 
unemployed low-wage worker whose income was insufficient to main 
tain any but the barest living standard can count on only a minimum 
benefit (if he or she manages to qualify at all) providing an even leaner 
existence. For the unemployed wage earner whose income is high but 
whose family responsibilities are heavy, the maximum weekly benefit 
amount may often cover only a small portion of expenses. However, 
the same benefit amount may adequately cover not only necessities but
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also many incidentals for a single wage earner with a paid-off mort 
gage and few financial obligations.
In the early 1950s, when most claimants were unable to receive a 50 
percent wage replacement because of low maximums, the pressure to 
raise maximums was often resisted by allegations that many claimants 
did receive a benefit equal to about half their take-home pay. No firm 
evidence was available to indicate how claimants were actually manag 
ing on their benefits while unemployed. As a result, the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor financed a series of UI benefit adequacy studies.
The results of these studies have been summarized by Becker 
(1961), Lester (1962), and Haber and Murray (1966). Becker (1980), 
while discussing the principles that should underlie any proposal for a 
federal benefit standard, reviewed the evidence from research in 
Tampa, Florida (1956), Anderson, South Carolina (1957), Albany, New 
York (1957), Portland, Oregon (1958), St. Louis, Missouri (1958), and 
Utica, New York (1958). These six similar studies were based on retro 
spective data on the income and expenditures of respondents during the 
period just prior to the survey date. Expenditures were divided into 
deferrable and nondeferrable categories. Spending on food, clothing, 
medical care, and housing constituted the nondeferrable group. Infor 
mation was gathered on four household types. After examining these 
studies, Becker concluded that
[n]one of the states came close to the proposed goal of paying 80 
percent of the beneficiaries half or more of their gross wage . . . 
[and i]t is one of the weaknesses of the system that claimants 
without dependents' are treated much better than claimants with 
dependents (1980, p. 26).
He suggested that benefit adequacy could be generally improved if 
benefit maximums were raised and programs for dependents' allow 
ances were expanded.
Becker (1961) found that benefits amounted to two-thirds or more of 
the income of unemployed single beneficiaries, more than 50 percent 
of family income for families with one wage earner, and about 40 per 
cent for families with two wage earners. The 1950s studies demon 
strated the usefulness of the one-half wage norm for assessing benefit 
adequacy. On average, benefits that were half or more of the wage were
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sufficient to cover nondeferrable expenses for all claimant household 
types (Becker 1980, p. 13).
The deferrable/nondeferrable distinction used in the 1950s studies 
was expanded by Blaustein and Mackin (1977). They added expendi 
tures made on a regular basis to repay outstanding debt to outlays for 
food, clothing, medical care, and housing, and labeled this total as 
"recurring" expenses. Using this concept as a basis for evaluating UI 
benefit adequacy, they found that over two-thirds of the beneficiary 
households in South Carolina had adequate income in 1977. Nonethe 
less, they recommended increasing benefit maximums to improve ade 
quacy.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters (1978a, 1978b), who conducted a 
detailed benefit adequacy study in Arizona, expanded the Blaustein- 
Mackin definition of recurring expenses to include expenditures on 
transportation, insurance, regular services, and regular support pay 
ments. They labeled this concept "necessary and obligated" expenses 
and used it to assess benefit adequacy for seven recipient household 
types.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters showed a wide disparity in how 
closely benefits came to meeting the ten groups of necessary and obli 
gated expenses for different categories of beneficiaries. As in the previ 
ous studies, the two most important factors, in addition to the weekly 
benefit amount, in determining the economic condition of the family 
during unemployment were the number of members to be supported 
and the number who were contributing to the support. Benefits were 
most adequate for recipients who had no other household members and 
who lived with relatives: 44 percent received a benefit equal to 100 per 
cent or more of their share of the ten categories of necessary and obli 
gated expenses. The next most adequate category consisted of husband 
and wife units in which both members worked. For 23.4 percent, the 
benefit amount represented 100 percent or more of expenses.
Benefits were least adequate in situations where the recipient was 
the only earner in a household with three or more persons. For only 2.3 
percent did the weekly benefit amount cover 100 percent or more of 
their expenses. For a majority of this category (56.1 percent), the bene 
fit was half or less of the expenditures.
The low maximum weekly benefit amount was the principal reason 
for the disparity in the benefit-expense ratios among the different cate-
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gories of Arizona beneficiaries studied. Sole wage earners, in house 
holds with two or more members including a spouse, generally had the 
highest wages and, consequently, were most often cut off by the maxi 
mum. For those individuals, the weekly benefit amount—usually the 
$85 maximum—was less adequate than for any other category of bene 
ficiary.
The expenditure studies essentially consider benefit adequacy in 
terms of the extent to which gross wages or take-home pay are replaced 
for claimants at different income levels. A 1988 Congressional 
Research Service benefit adequacy study established three hypothetical 
claimants (each married with two children) at three preunemployment 
wage levels: low wage (102 percent of the 1986 poverty threshold for a 
four-person family); average wage (state 1986 average weekly wage 
for workers in covered employment); high wage (four times the 1986 
poverty threshold for a four-person family). Benefits were calculated 
according to each state's provisions as of January 1, 1988. States were 
ranked from that with the highest replacement rate to the lowest (Con 
gressional Research Service 1988, pp. 210-248).
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) originated theoretical, optimal 
UI models. The models are similar in that both attempt to solve for 
characteristics of the UI system that would maximize the expected life 
time utility of a representative worker. The UI program choice parame 
ters for this problem are the wage replacement rate and the potential 
duration of benefits. Both Baily and Flemming assume an infinite 
potential duration of benefits, and each determines that optimal 
replacement rates are in the range of those provided by the states. Baily 
finds that
[if the] degree of relative risk aversion by workers [is] unity, and if 
workers do not prolong their duration of unemployment very 
much as a result of UI payments [i.e., if the elasticity of a spell of 
unemployment with respect to a change in the benefit amount is 
about 0.15] then if the benefit-wage ratio is 50% it is about right 
(1978, p. 393).
The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the benefit amount 
assumed by Baily (1978) is in line with estimates summarized in chap-
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ter 7. Flemming qualifies his statements with capital market consider 
ations concluding that, under perfect capital markets, a replacement 
rate of 50 percent is too high, and "[i]f there is no lending or borrowing 
the optimal rates rise to about 75 percent (1978, p. 403)."
Davidson and Woodbury examine optimal UI with "an equilibrium 
search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemploy- 
ment bonus experiments and secondary sources" (1996, p. BB-4). As 
did Baily and Flemming, they find that, if potential UI duration were 
infinite, replacement rates should optimally be 50 percent. However, 
Davidson and Woodbury also estimate that, if potential duration is lim 
ited to the standard 26 weeks, then the UI system should optimally 
replace all of lost earnings.
Consumption Smoothing
An indirect way of assessing the adequacy of existing UI benefit 
replacement is to investigate how workers' customary consumption 
patterns change when they become unemployed. That is, would con 
sumption decline appreciably during periods of unemployment in the 
absence of UI benefits? Alternatively, is personal saving the real foun 
dation for consumption smoothing, with UI simply acting to reduce the 
dissaving that would naturally occur during periods of unemployment?
Grossman (1973), using data from the six state studies of UI benefit 
adequacy done in the 1950s under the sponsorship of the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, addressed the expenditure response to unemployment 
for different categories of household members. Applying an allocation 
of time model of consumer-worker behavior, he predicted that, in an 
effort to maintain real income, people who become unemployed would 
increase consumption of goods that involve relatively more home- 
based production activity. Grossman found that the unemployed do 
substitute leisure for market goods in an attempt to maintain customary 
consumption levels, but that the response to unemployment of second 
ary market workers is much greater than for the primary earner in a 
household.6 He suggested that, as the labor force changes to include a 
greater share of secondary workers, the transitory component of aggre 
gate consumer expenditure would increase.
Hamermesh also studied how UI affects the pattern of consumption. 
He concluded that UI benefits only partly help to smooth consumption
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during periods of lost earnings due to unemployment, and that as much 
as half of the benefits received are spent as if "individuals were fully 
able to borrow or had sufficient savings to meet transitory losses of 
income without any disruption in their consumption spending." From 
this he argues that a "large part of UI benefits does little to stabilize the 
economy, because people consume them as if they were fully 
expected" (1982, pp. 110-111).
More recently, Gruber estimated that, in the absence of UI, average 
consumption expenditure by unemployed persons would fall by 22 per 
cent (1994, p. 30). This is more than three times the decline estimated 
in the presence of UI. He suggested that the observed levels of wage 
replacement are appropriate only at fairly high rates of relative risk 
aversion.7 Gruber also finds that UI helps to smooth consumption dur 
ing the period of job loss but that it has no permanent effect.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters (1978b) showed that Arizona recipi 
ents unemployed for 13 weeks reduced their spending on necessary 
and obligated expenses by at least 20 percent from pre-unemployment 
levels. Spending patterns were governed by the availability of other 
income as well as benefits: sources included savings, borrowing, sales 
of assets, and income from working members of the family. The 
amount of retrenchment was determined also by such intangible fac 
tors as claimants' prior anticipations of layoffs and expectations of 
reemployment.
For the 1950s studies, Becker (1961) found that, in states experienc 
ing periods of prosperity, beneficiaries maintained their expenditures at 
almost normal levels. The cut in spending was much greater in states 
having recessions. Given these variables, perhaps all that can be con 
cluded is that without UI, retrenchment would have come earlier and 
been more drastic—particularly for those families without much other 
income.
In an extension of the consumption smoothing studies, Hamermesh 
and Slesnick (1995) approached the question of UI benefit adequacy 
from the perspective of applied welfare theory and estimated house 
hold equivalence scales. Using quarterly household panel data for 
1980-1993 from the Consumer Expenditure Survey published by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, they investigated the question: How 
well do UI benefits insure consumption streams against spells of unem 
ployment? Their essential finding was that current levels of benefits
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adequately compensate households that receive UI benefits. However, 
they tempered their conclusion by noting that UI benefit recipiency is 
not universal among unemployed American workers.
While replacing lost income is the prime aim of UI, an explicit cor 
ollary goal of the system is to stabilize aggregate spending by main 
taining purchasing power during economic down turns. Blaustein 
reviewed the aggregate adequacy of benefit payments in performing 
the countercyclical function of stabilizing aggregate spending in the 
economy (1993, pp. 59-60). Citing research summarized by Hamer- 
mesh (1977, pp. 62-64) and the econometric studies by Oaxaca and 
Taylor (1986), he concludes that UI has a small but significant influ 
ence in maintaining purchasing power so that "economic stabilization 
can legitimately be considered as one of the objectives of unemploy 
ment insurance." This is consistent with studies of consumption 
smoothing based on household survey data.
Compensating Wage Differentials
If labor markets are efficient, wages will adjust to compensate work 
ers in jobs with a relatively high risk of unemployment. Efficient labor 
markets take into account the fact that UI provides direct compensation 
to beneficiaries involuntarily out of work. As a result, wage differen 
tials across Ul-covered jobs with varying layoff risks are smaller than 
they would be in the absence of UI.
Using data from the first nine waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, corresponding to calendar years 1967-1975, Abowd and 
Ashenfelter (1981) estimated that compensating wage differentials 
range from about 1 percent in industries where workers experience lit 
tle anticipated unemployment to over 14 percent in industries with sub 
stantial anticipated unemployment and unemployment risk. By one 
method they also estimate that the implicit price of UI, in terms of 
wage reductions, is about equal to the expected UI benefits. Abowd and 
Ashenfelter performed their computations based on sample average UI 
wage replacement rates by industry.
Anderson (1994), who has studied compensating wage differentials 
in a model of optimal UI, used replacement rates simulated for each 
individual from the statutory provisions of the states. He asserts that UI 
benefit levels prior to the 1970s were inadequate, but that past deficien-
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cies have been corrected. Based on empirical analysis of data from the 
1986 Current Population Survey, Anderson concludes that the prospect 
of UI induces workers "to accept a somewhat lower wage in industries 
that involve higher unemployment risk" (1994, p. 653). He also says 
that actual "UI benefits approximate the level that would exist if an 
efficient UI market were available...and that...the average wage offset 
for UI benefits is approximately equal to the cost of their provision."
The studies of compensating wage differentials find that markets do 
adjust wages to account for the risk of unemployment and for the pres 
ence of UI. The research also suggests that if the UI market were fully 
private, given wage rates currently prevailing in the economy, agents 
would voluntarily choose the level of income protection afforded by 
the present federal-state system of UI.
Consumer Choice Theory and Unemployment Compensation
Consumer expenditure surveys of the type done in the 1950s and 
1970s, while extremely valuable, have proven to be quite expensive. 
Becker noted that for the benefit adequacy studies done in the 1950s, 
"[t]he time spent per interview averaged about three hours, with a 
range from one to fourteen hours, exclusive of the time spent in re- 
interviews of the more difficult cases" (1961, p. 23). The high cost of 
gathering data has resulted in small sample sizes, but a more funda 
mental problem exists with the traditional approach. These studies 
presume that the analyst may determine which categories of expendi 
ture are "necessary" or which items a household may need most.
The problems of sample size and expenditure category selection 
have been addressed by using readily available large data sets and an 
agnostic approach to measuring unemployment compensation based 
on the economic theory of consumer-worker behavior. The methodol 
ogy relies on a natural, theoretical approach to estimating the upper 
limit on unemployment compensation: solve for the lump sum pay 
ment, which, when given to unemployed individuals, makes them 
indifferent between their current lot and their pre-unemployment one. 
This lump sum payment might be termed "full unemployment com 
pensation." It should be noted that this full compensation will be less 
than lost earnings, because there is a positive economic value to lei 
sure.
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The labor-leisure choice model of economic consumer theory can be 
used to examine compensation required for a worker who experiences 
involuntary unemployment. The ideas embodied in this approach may 
be understood by referring to the indifference curve analysis of figure 
5.2. An unconstrained individual, with preferences as represented by 
the map of indifference curves labeled U 1 and U° in the figure, would 
reach an unconstrained optimum equilibrium on U° at point E enjoying 
L° units of leisure and Y° unites of income to purchase goods in the 
market. With T representing total hours available for leisure, L, and 
hours of work H, if market opportunities allow sales of fewer than the 
desired hours of labor services, say # = r - L1 , a lower level of utility is 
reached on the indifference curve U 1 where L1 units of leisure and Y 1 
units of income are consumed. While there is a hardship experienced 
as a result of the associated earnings loss (Y° - Y 1 ), the utility loss is 
partly compensated by an increase in leisure, and the income required 
to fully compensate the constrained individual (Y - Y1 ) is less than the 
earnings loss.
Figure 5.2 An Indifference Curve Analysis of Full Unemployment 
Compensation
Leisure
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Alternatively, full compensation for hours of work at H which is less 
than the desired hours H° can be represented by the crosshatched area 
in figure 5.3. The compensated labor supply curve is constructed 
around the equilibrium (H°, w°) so that utility is constant. It is more 
wage elastic than the ordinary money income constant labor supply 
curve. The consumer-worker is indifferent between working H° at the 
wage rate w° and working H at w° if given the lump sum income repre 
sented by the crosshatched area in figure 5.3. 8
Kingston et al. (1981) investigated the possibility of evaluating ben 
efit adequacy on the basis of readily available survey (Continuous 
Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) and claims data. The authors con 
cluded, however, "that information on income and household composi 
tion must be supplemented with actual or estimated data on household 
expenditure patterns to predict individual benefit adequacy values with 
a reasonable degree of accuracy" (Kingston et al. 1981, p. 43). Other 
writers have presented results that suggest a greater potential for 
applied theoretical methods to yield reasonable estimates of adequate 
UI compensation.
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Ashenfelter (1980), in the context of a household model where 
unemployment is treated as a rationing constraint, estimated an 
approximation to a quantity that he refers to as the "lump-sum com 
pensation required to restore the unemployed [rationed] worker's fam 
ily to the welfare level of the fully employed family" (p. 552). 9 Kurd 
(1980) examined the cost of unemployment to the unemployed using 
an approximation similar to that of Ashenfelter, to study the experience 
of respondents to the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. He esti 
mated the required lump sum compensation to unemployed individuals 
by evaluating the area under this locus between the actual (constrained) 
and fully employed levels of labor supply. 10
O'Leary (1990) estimated the lump sum compensation required to 
restore a single unemployed person with no dependents to the welfare 
level of a fully employed worker using both approximation and direct 
closed form solution methods. He also compared these results to the 
compensation forthcoming under various state UI programs. O'Leary 
(1996) then expanded the application of directly computing estimates 
of full compensation from closed form solutions, applying the method 
to six different types of household members working in the labor mar 
ket, with and without dependents.
Empirical results based on theoretical models of consumer-worker 
behavior presented by Ashenfelter, Hurd, and O'Leary all suggest that 
the current UI practice of replacing one-half of lost wages tends to 
overcompensate for short spells of unemployment and undercompen- 
sate for long spells. O'Leary (1996) found that the presence of depen 
dents affects full compensation to men and women in opposite ways. 
For the specification yielding the most plausible set of empirical 
results, O'Leary found that the presence of dependents significantly 
increases the full compensation required for unemployed women but 
slightly decreases the compensation due men. 11 Since UI is not 
intended to fully compensate the loss an individual experiences as a 
result of being unemployed, a financial inducement should remain for 
returning to work. Full compensation estimates suggest an upper 
bound on the share of lost income that benefits might replace.
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Policy Issues
While there is a broad consensus on both the 50 percent wage 
replacement criterion and the concept of tying benefit amounts to pre 
vious wages, there remains controversy over how to accomplish these 
aims in practice. In addition to these matters, this section discusses 
practical aspects of allowances for dependents.
Benefit Formula
As summarized in table 5.3, four different kinds of basic weekly 
benefit amount formulas are used. Various applications of these four 
types result in a great variety of wage replacement rates (U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor 1995a, table 304). Blaustein (1980), who studied thir 
teen states, showed that for claimants with 26 weeks of work at the U.S 
average weekly wage (then $233.30), the weekly benefit amount would 
range from 28 percent to 53 percent of wages across the states. At the 
extremes, claimants with identical wage and base-period employment 
experience could draw a weekly benefit almost twice as large in one 
state as in another. The actual weekly amounts for these claimants 
ranged from $65 to $123.
Table 5.3 Distribution of States by Weekly Benefit Amount Formula Type 
for the Years 1948,1971,1990, and 1995





























SOURCE: Blaustein (1993, p. 293) and U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, pp. 3-35 to 3-38).
The major reason for the great diversity is that the states alone deter 
mine the weekly benefit amounts. State autonomy over basic program 
elements is a fundamental principle of the American UI system. The 
diversity itself has sometimes been an issue. Extreme differences
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across states in treatment of similar claimants provide support for those 
who urge greater uniformity through minimum federal benefit stan 
dards.
The four general types of formulas used by the states to compute 
benefits are as listed in table 5.3: high-quarter wage, multi-quarter 
wage, average weekly wage, and annual wage. Brief discussions of 
each type follow.
High-Quarter Formula
In more than half of the 53 UI programs in the United States, the 
weekly benefit amount is computed as a percentage of the claimant's 
wages in the calendar quarter of his or her base period in which earn 
ings were the highest. In the majority of these "high-quarter states," 
weekly benefits are computed as 1/26 of high-quarter wages, on the 
assumption that the high-quarter wage represents income for full 
employment for all 13 weeks of the quarter. However, many claimants 
do not have 13 weeks of steady employment, even in their highest 
earning quarter. For them, the 1/26 fraction produces less than a 50 
percent wage replacement. Accordingly, some states provide a fraction 
larger than 1/26 of high-quarter earnings. A 1/20 fraction would pro 
vide a 50 percent wage replacement for a claimant who had only 10 
weeks of work in the high quarter and a 65 percent wage replacement 
for one who worked all 13 weeks. A 1/24 fraction represents a 50 per 
cent wage replacement for an individual who missed one week, 46 per 
cent for one who missed two, and 54 percent for a claimant with 13 full 
weeks of employment in the high quarter.
Some states specify more than one fraction (e.g., 1/20-1/25) for 
computing benefits. These "weighted" formulas provide benefits repre 
senting a greater percentage of pay to relatively low-wage claimants 
than to high-wage claimants. They thus offer wage-related benefits, but 
the benefit-wage ratios vary according to income. For this reason, these 
formulas have been opposed by some as introducing an element of 
need into the program. Others contest the premise that since low-wage 
workers spend a larger percentage of their income on essentials, their 
benefits should replace a higher share of their income. In this case, the 
argument is that many low-wage workers are members of high-income 
faniilies.
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Another problem of the high-quarter formula is that there may be a 
substantial gap between the time the claimant's earnings are measured 
for benefit purposes and the time they were actually earned. This is due 
more to the definition of the base period than to any inherent defect in 
the high-quarter formula. For example, most states define the base 
period as the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters 
immediately preceding the filing of a new claim. This is to allow a 
quarter interval for obtaining and recording wage data.
Accordingly, the base period for a claim filed April 1 would be the 
previous calendar year. The "lag period" would be three months. How 
ever, if the claim were filed March 31, for example, the first four of the 
last five completed calendar quarters would be the four quarters ending 
September 30 of the previous year. There would thus be a gap between 
the base period and the claim of almost six months. If the high quarter 
were the first quarter of the base period, high-quarter wages could be 
almost 15 months old. For this reason, some high-quarter states have 
narrowed the gap by defining the base period as the most recent four 
quarters under certain conditions. 12
Multi-Quarter Formula
While some states with a high-quarter benefit formula have boosted 
the fraction applied to earnings somewhat above 1/26 to compensate 
for possible unemployment during the high quarter, the quarter with 
the highest earnings in the year certainly has either the least unemploy 
ment or the most overtime earnings and perhaps both. In recent years, 
several states have switched from computing benefits as a percentage 
of the claimant's high-quarter earnings to setting the weekly benefit 
amount as a percentage of the average quarterly income in more than 
one quarter, usually in the two highest income quarters in the base year. 
Washington State in 1977 was the first to use a multi-quarter formula. 
As shown in table 5.3, since that time fourteen states have tried this 
approach.
The multi-quarter alternative reflects a desire to balance the compet 
ing factors that influence fluctuations in average weekly earnings: time 
out of work due to unemployment and earnings in excess of the norm 
due to overtime hours. A multi-quarter formula is more likely to reflect 
usual full-time wages than is the high-quarter formula since, by consid-
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ering a greater fraction of a calendar year, a better estimate of custom 
ary earnings will be provided.
Average Weekly Wage Formula
Only a half-dozen states compute the weekly benefit as a percentage 
of the claimant's average weekly wages in the base period, or in a part 
of the base period. In the calculation of the benefit, these states disre 
gard weeks with no earnings or weeks in which earnings were below a 
stated amount. How a week of work or the average weekly wage are 
defined is crucial to whether or not the formula will yield a realistic 
benefit.
The average weekly wage formula has the advantage of making it 
possible to incorporate a base period immediately prior to the begin 
ning of unemployment, thus permitting the use of recent wages as the 
basis for benefits. The wage data are usually obtained on a request 
basis from employers, as needed. In the late 1980s, several states with 
average weekly wage formulas switched to quarterly formulas, 
dropped request wage reporting, and forfeited the contiguous base 
period-benefit year. In large part, this was due to a 1984 federal law 
amendment that all states require employers to make quarterly reports 
of wages to a state agency. 13 The goal was to facilitate another require 
ment for a wider range of cross-checking among benefit and other pro 
grams for purposes of income and eligibility verification.
Annual Wage Formula
As of 1995, only five states compute the weekly benefit as a percent 
age of annual wages. The rationale for these formulas is the notion that 
a worker's annual earnings, rather than the weekly paycheck, deter 
mine the individual's standard of living. The first proposal for an 
annual wage formula was made by Frank B. Cliffe of the General Elec 
tric Company (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 176). He recommended that 
1 percent of annual earnings be set as the weekly benefit amount. This 
would yield a 50 percent replacement of full-time wages only for 
workers who had 50 weeks of full-time work in the base period. Cur 
rently, the fractions range from 0.8 percent to 4.4 percent of annual 
wages. 14 Two states weight the schedules by providing claimants with 
lower annual earnings a higher percentage of annual wages.
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Under the annual wage formula, it is not possible to ensure that the 
weekly benefit will be a fixed proportion of normal weekly wages. For 
example, a worker who earned $12,000 in the base period would qual 
ify for a weekly benefit amount of $240 if the benefit is set at 2 percent 
of wages. The $240 benefit would represent 50 percent of the claim 
ant's weekly wages only if the $12,000 represented 25 weeks of work. 
If the individual had worked more than 25 weeks to earn the $12,000, 
the $240 would be more than 50 percent of the weekly wage. If the 
claimant earned the $12,000 in fewer weeks, the benefit would be a 
percentage smaller than 50 percent of the weekly wage.
Annual wage formulas generally have the highest qualifying 
requirements of all states, but they also regularly provide the smallest 
weekly wage replacement ratio, particularly for workers with some 
unemployment or underemployment during the base period. Blaustein 
(1980, p. 194) showed that for half of the annual wage states examined, 
unless claimants had from 40 to 47 weeks of employment at a constant 
wage, individuals could not draw a weekly benefit amount representing 
half their weekly wages.
The Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount
On an individual level, the wage replacement ratio is a useful mea 
sure of benefit adequacy. For a given benefit formula, the maximum 
weekly benefit amount determines what proportion of claimants will 
receive the wage replacement ratio prescribed by the formula. There is 
little agreement on where the maximum should be set. Too high a max 
imum invites public criticism. Too low a maximum will prevent an 
excessive number of claimants from receiving a reasonable wage 
replacement. This is because, with a low maximum, the majority of 
claimants will receive the maximum rather than a benefit equal to half 
their lost wages (or whatever wage replacement ratio is intended by the 
benefit formula).
Benefit Maximums
Setting a maximum level on the weekly benefit amount is necessary 
to conserve the fund and to prevent inordinately high benefits being 
paid to any individual claimant. The Social Security Board (1938) sug 
gested a maximum of $15 per week, which was in accord with the level
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Table 5.4 Percentage of UI Beneficiaries Eligible for the Maximum 












































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE. Unpublished data provided by the Division of Actuarial Services, Unemployment 
Insurance Service, U.S. Department of Labor
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fixed by most states at the time. Some states adopted higher maxi- 
mums: the maximum in Michigan was $16; in Wyoming, $18. The first 
UI check, issued August 17, 1936 by the Wisconsin agency to Neils B. 
Ruud, was for the $15 maximum.
Benefit maximums limit the extent to which the 50 percent concept, 
or other wage replacement rates intended by a benefit formula, can 
apply. With a 50 percent wage replacement rule, only those claimants 
with wage levels not more than twice the maximum will receive a 50 
percent wage replacement. In most states, payments below the maxi 
mum are made at the rate of approximately 50 percent of lost wages; 
therefore, the proportion of beneficiaries receiving less than the maxi 
mum is a proxy for the proportion "adequately" compensated. Becker 
(1980, p. 13) found that roughly 34 percent of payments have been at 
the maximum, so that in broad terms the popular norm of adequacy— 
one-half for four-fifths—has not been met.
Table 5.4 lists the percentage of UI beneficiaries eligible for the 
maximum weekly benefit amount, by state, for various years since 
1975. This table indicates that, over the past twenty years, there has 
been general improvement in the fraction of claimants receiving one- 
half wage replacement. It is interesting to note, by reference also to 
table 5.2 where statutory rules for setting state maximum weekly bene 
fit amounts are listed, that the gain in the extent of benefit adequacy has 
been steadiest in states that currently adjust their maximum by statu 
tory rule. Over the past twenty years the share of beneficiaries at the 
maximum weekly benefit amount has steadily declined in two states, 
Florida and Texas, which adjust their maximum by legislative discre 
tion, as well as in three other states, Kentucky, North Dakota, and 
Washington, where the maximum is adjusted by statutory rule. Over 
the past ten years, among the sixteen states showing steady progress in 
this measure of adequacy, eleven adjust the maximum by rule and five 
adjust by discretion. 15
The Level of the Maximum
The major issue is the level at which the maximum should be set. In 
this evaluation, one criterion of adequacy has been the percentage of 
claimants who are prevented from receiving at least a 50 percent wage 
replacement because of the maximum. Generally, the level is consid 
ered too low if a majority of claimants are eligible for the maximum.
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With a maximum that equals 50 percent of the statewide average 
weekly wage, only claimants who earned the average wage in the state 
or less will receive half their lost wages. In most states, this will proba 
bly be fewer than half the number of claimants. Accordingly, if the 
majority of claimants are to receive half their lost wages rather than the 
maximum, the maximum will need to be set at more than 50 percent of 
the statewide average weekly wage. Table 5.2 provides a listing of the 
weekly benefit amount maximums by state and of the weekly benefit 
amount maximums as percentages of state average weekly wages.
A federal standard requiring the maximum weekly benefit amount 
to equal or exceed two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage 
would allow a majority of covered workers to receive at least 50 per 
cent wage replacement and would eliminate the wide variation among 
states in the proportion of workers eligible to receive such a percentage 
of lost wages. It would not, however, necessarily provide a 50 percent 
wage replacement to the "great" majority. Crosslin and Ross (1980) 
showed that a maximum equal to two-thirds of the statewide average 
weekly wage would not, with few exceptions, provide 80 percent of 
beneficiaries with a 50 percent wage replacement, regardless of 
whether the target group was covered workers, insured workers, claim 
ants, or beneficiaries. The researchers found that the maximum weekly 
benefit amount would have to be set at 75 percent of average state 
wages if covered workers were the target group, 80 percent if insured 
workers were selected, and 85 percent for either claimants or beneficia 
ries (Crosslin and Ross 1980, p. 73).
The proportion of workers able to receive a 50 percent wage 
replacement is governed primarily by the level of the maximum, but it 
is also influenced by the benefit formula. The percentage of workers 
eligible for a 50 percent wage replacement below the maximum influ 
ences the effectiveness of the maximum. A state with a 1/20 high-quar 
ter fraction, for example, will require a lower maximum to reach an 
overall wage replacement goal than would a state with a less generous 
fraction.
Another factor influencing the proportion of workers able to receive 
a 50 percent wage replacement is the distribution of income levels 
within a state. For example, although the 1980 maximums for Rhode 
Island and South Carolina were both set at 55 percent of the statewide 
average weekly wage, Crosslin and Ross (1980) showed that this
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would allow 70 percent of claimants in South Carolina to qualify for a 
50 percent wage replacement, but only 63 percent of those in Rhode 
Island.
It has been recommended that the maximum weekly benefit amount 
equal two-thirds of the average wage in covered employment to meet 
the one-half for four-fifths standard. Presently, legislation in nine states 
specifies that the maximum weekly benefit amount shall be 2/3 or more 
of the average weekly wage in the state. Table 5.2 lists percentages of 
state average weekly wages at which the maximum weekly benefit 
must be set by statute, along with the actual maximum weekly benefit 
amount as of January 1996 and the ratio of that maximum to state aver 
age weekly wages in the prior year. 16 According to Papier the maxi 
mum weekly benefit amount should be tied to average base period 
earnings of beneficiaries (1974, p. 390). Papier estimated that to 
achieve one-half for four-fifths wage replacement, maximums would 
have to be set at 70 percent of average base-period earnings for benefi 
ciaries without dependents and at 80 percent for beneficiaries with 
dependents.
Flexible Maximum
During the 1940s and into the 1950s, benefit maximums generally 
declined in relation to state average wage levels. Although wage levels 
rose rapidly, most states increased their maximums infrequently and by 
small amounts. Each increase required legislative action. Most legisla 
tures convened only once every two years. Failure to increase the max 
imum at least every legislative year meant that the maximum lost 
ground in relation to wages.
As wages rise, proportionately more claimants qualify for the maxi 
mum, instead of a benefit related directly to their wages, unless the 
maximum also increases. To avoid the need for periodic legislative 
adjustments, by the mid-1950s several states turned to the "flexible 
maximum" concept, which sets the maximum as a specified percentage 
of the state average weekly wage in covered employment. Without fur 
ther legislative action, the maximum amount is adjusted periodically, 
usually once a year, to maintain a constant relationship with wage lev 
els.
As shown in table 5.2, thirty-three states specify that the maximum 
weekly benefit amount shall be adjusted annually to equal a fixed frac-
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tion of the state average weekly wage. It should be noted that this list 
does not include some large states such as New York, California, and 
Florida. Moreover, because of state trust fund conditions, the maxi 
mum has been "frozen" in several states either indefinitely or for spec 
ified periods (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a, table 305). Still other 
states have provisions that limit the statutory increase in the maximum 
weekly benefit amount if the state UI benefit trust is poorly funded.
Other Considerations in Setting the Maximum
Not all states accept the concept of the flexible maximum. Some 
states are reluctant to relinquish legislative control over the maximum, 
preferring to retain increases as legislative options. Others may fear the 
inflationary potential of indexing benefits to wage levels.
States are not uniformly willing to establish a maximum high 
enough to ensure that a majority of workers receive 50 percent wage 
replacement if they become unemployed. For some, cost is a barrier. 
For example, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion estimated that the increase in costs in 1980 of setting all benefit 
maximums to at least 55 percent of statewide average weekly wages 
would have been about 15 percent in total. The cost impact would have 
ranged from no increase in several states that already provided a maxi 
mum that high, to an increase of more than 100 percent in Alaska. A 
rise in maximums to 60 percent would have meant an increment in 
national costs of about 19 percent, and, if the maximum had been set at 
two-thirds, national costs would have increased by about 25 percent 
over 1979 levels. The commission estimates were based on the 
assumption of a 7.5 percent unemployment rate (National Commission 
on Unemployment Compensation 1980, pp. 40-41).
Some state legislative provisions reflect the belief that claimants 
should share with employers the obligation for fund solvency, or at 
least for restoring depleted funds. A few states tie the maximum to a 
specific fund level, or condition any rise in the maximum on a solvency 
criterion. Opponents of these practices argue that unemployed claim 
ants should not have to share the additional burden of ensuring that suf 
ficient funds are available to maintain adequate benefits. Other states 
may simply oppose dollar figures that appear too high in relation to the 
wage levels of many workers. Some may prefer to focus on improve-
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ments in such priorities as benefit formulas or benefit duration, or they 
may opt for a program of minimum benefits.
Other Policy Issues
Minimum Weekly Benefit Amount
The original laws of almost all the states included a minimum 
weekly benefit of $5. Ignoring dependents' allowances, in 1995 the 
minimum ranged from $5 in Hawaii to $75 in New Jersey. A few states 
provide flexible minimums, established as either a percentage (10 per 
cent or 15 percent) of the statewide average weekly wage, a percentage 
of the maximum weekly benefit amount (19 percent or 25 percent), or 
a percentage (4 percent) of the qualifying wages in the high quarter.
One simple objective explanation for why minimums on weekly 
benefits are set by states is to relieve the administrative burden of pro 
cessing weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount. A nor 
mative rationale for setting a minimum is based on benefit adequacy 
concerns. A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the 
minimum "be related to the weekly wages of the lowest wage group in 
the state for which the unemployment insurance program is considered 
appropriate" (U.S. Department of Labor 1962). In general, it is the 
minimum qualifying requirement that is set in relation to the lowest 
income group for whom the program is considered appropriate, and the 
minimum benefit is a by-product of that requirement.
The minimum weekly benefit and the state's minimum qualifying 
requirement are usually interrelated, and a change in one will often 
automatically provide a change in the other. For example, in a state 
with a high-quarter formula, where the minimum weekly benefit 
amount is set at 1/25 of the minimum qualifying income of $1,000 in 
high-quarter wages, a $200 increase in the high-quarter requirement 
will automatically result in increasing the $40 minimum benefit to $48. 
Conversely, a change in the minimum weekly benefit amount can result 
in an automatic change in the qualifying requirement. If Connecticut, 
for example, were to raise its $15 minimum to $25, its qualifying 
requirement of 40 times the weekly benefit amount would automati 
cally increase its current $600 base-period minimum qualifying 
requirement to $1,000.
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If the object is to key the minimum qualifying requirement (or the 
minimum benefit) to the needs of the lowest appropriate wage group, 
the goal may be defeated by the flexible minimums that have been 
described, which are tied directly or indirectly to changes in the state's 
average weekly wage. Increases in the state average wage may not be 
representative of the wage status of the lowest-wage group for whom 
the program is considered relevant.
Dependents 'Allowances
The principal argument for dependents' allowances is simple: work 
ers with dependents generally have less short-term flexibility for reduc 
ing expenditures than do other workers. While household heads have 
higher average wages than either single or married secondary workers, 
beneficiary studies also indicate that family heads devote a greater per 
centage of their earnings to meeting nondeferrable expenses (Haber 
and Murray 1966, p. 180).
The principal objection to dependents' allowances has been that 
they introduce an element of need into UI. Opponents argue that, 
although neither income nor means tests are involved, the payment of 
allowances and the required proof of dependents depart from the con 
cept that benefits should be based solely on wages and payable to those 
who meet qualifying requirements as a matter of right.
Advocates, however, argue that allowances reflect only the general 
presumption, from a benefit adequacy perspective, that workers with 
dependents need more than do other workers:
The vital difference that still exists between unemployment insur 
ance and relief is that no individual inquiry and determination is 
made as to whether the claimant actually needs the dependents' 
benefit in order to house, feed, and clothe the dependent. The 
claimant merely has to establish that he has legal dependents; his 
personal affairs are not investigated (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 
193).
Opponents have also contended that dependents' allowances have 
too often been used as substitutes for adequate basic benefits. Their 
position is that, since workers with dependents tend to have higher 
wages than those without, the "presumptive greater needs" of these 
workers can be met by higher benefit maximums, without the complex-
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ities and inequities of the allowances (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, pp. 
78-81).
Dependents' allowances tend to favor men over women claimants. 
Women are usually required to give more information and to answer 
more questions than men in claiming allowances. Generally, allow 
ances are payable only to claimants who provide more than half of the 
support for a dependent. Working wives often earn lower wages than 
their husbands do and, consequently, qualify less frequently. Data for 
10 states with dependents' allowances showed that, over a ten-year 
period (1968-1977), a far higher percentage of male claimants received 
such allowances. Except in two states where no allowances were pay 
able to claimants at the maximum, about 17 percent of the women ben 
eficiaries received allowances in 1977, in contrast to 48 percent of the 
men (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, p. 89).
Originally, only the District of Columbia provided for dependents' 
allowances. In 1995, thirteen states paid higher weekly benefits to 
claimants with dependents. This compares with fourteen states in 
1990, ten states in 1971, and five in 1948. The weekly benefit provi 
sions of half of the ten largest states took account of dependents in 
1995. The states vary in the definition of compensable dependent and 
in the amount of the allowance granted (U.S. Department of Labor 
1995a, tables 307 and 308). All include children, usually under 18, typ 
ically encompassing stepchildren and adopted children. All but one 
include older children unable to work because of physical or mental 
disability. Most include a nonworking spouse. Three states include par 
ents unable to work because of disability or infirmity. Three include a 
brother or sister under 18 orphaned or whose living parents are depen 
dents.
Children and a nonworking spouse usually can be counted as depen 
dents if the claimant provided more than half of their support and they 
are unemployed or have limited earnings. In almost all states, only one 
parent may draw allowances if both are receiving benefits simulta 
neously.
In seven states, the allowance for each dependent is a fixed amount. 
Two states make the allowance a percentage of the individual's weekly 
benefit amount. A few states base the allowance not only on the num 
ber of dependents but also on the amount of the claimant's earnings. In 
these states, the maximum weekly benefit amount and the earnings
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required to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount vary 
according to the number of dependents. The higher the number of 
dependents, generally, the higher the maximum weekly benefit amount 
and the higher the wage requirement for the maximum. All states have 
a limit on the total amount of dependents' allowances payable in any 
week, in terms of dollars, number of dependents, or the percentage of 
basic benefits, of high-quarter wages, or of average weekly wage. The 
dependents' allowance affects the maximum benefits payable on a 
claim in Alaska and Rhode Island where the fixed dependents' allow 
ance is paid in any compensable week whether the claimant is fully or 
partially unemployed.
Recommendations of Federal Advisory Councils
In 1939, the scope of the Federal Advisory Council on Employment 
Security was broadened to include UI. As mentioned earlier, regarding 
pronouncements on benefit policy, Haber and Murray say that as early 
as 1955 the "Advisory Council recommended that the maximum 
should be equal to from three-fifths to two-thirds of the state-wide 
average weekly wage" (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 183). Few other 
recommendations of this council are noted elsewhere. In concluding 
their book, Haber and Murray recommend the following:
A high level commission should be periodically appointed by the 
President, possibly in cooperation with congressional leaders, of 
persons of the highest standing in the ranks of management, labor, 
and the general public, to give a comprehensive view of the major . 
policy issues regarding unemployment insurance (1966, p. 504).
Since that time, two such bodies have been created. Both have made 
clear proposals for benefit levels. The proposals are virtually identical. 
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation was 
established by Congress as part of Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-566, Section 411, approved 
October 20, 1976). It was the first comprehensive review mandated by 
Congress. When making recommendations concerning the weekly 
benefit amount for federal guidelines to be specified in Federal Unem-
202 Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount
ployment Tax Act (FUTA) amendments, the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation proposed the following two rules:
(1) Each state must have a maximum weekly benefit amount 
which is not less than two-thirds of the average total weekly 
wages in covered employment in the state in the preceding year.
(2) Each state must provide a weekly benefit amount between the 
minimum and maximum weekly benefit which averages at least 
50 percent of the individual's average weekly wages (1980, p. 42).
Amendments to Section 908 of the Social Security Act, as contained 
in the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, provided 
for establishment of the Advisory- Council on Unemployment Compen 
sation. In its second annual report, presented in February 1995, the 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation proposed the fol 
lowing:
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent 
of lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly 
benefit amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly 
wages (1995, p. 20).
Both the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 
and the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation sought to 
ensure one-half wage replacement for at least 80 percent of beneficia 
ries. The popular standard of UI benefit adequacy first stated in the 
1950s as one-half for four-fifths, continues to be the preferred norm.
Summary and Conclusion
A broad consensus has evolved that weekly UI benefits should 
replace about half of lost weekly earnings. This level of adequacy has 
been shown in numerous studies to satisfy the short-term spending 
needs of households. The states have chosen to determine weekly ben 
efit amounts using various formulas; the most popular ones are based 
on earnings in the quarter of the base year when earnings are highest. If 
the unemployment compensation paid to beneficiaries were compared 
to the individuals' prior earnings, most states would be seen to meet 
the one-half wage replacement criterion of adequacy.
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In all of the consumer expenditure studies of benefit adequacy, the 
level of the maximum appears to be the most important single factor in 
determining the average benefit-wage ratio and, consequently, the ben 
efit-expense ratio. The level of the maximum also directly affects the 
proportion of claimants eligible for one-half wage replacement. Since 
the 1950s the publicly stated federal goal has been one-half for four- 
fifths, or 50 percent wage replacement for at least 80 percent of claim 
ants. The most popular benefit maximum rule to help achieve this goal 
is to set the state maximum weekly benefit amount at two-thirds of the 
average weekly wage in Ul-covered employment.
The issues of dependents' allowances and minimum weekly benefit 
amounts raise questions about whether aspects of need should be 
addressed by UI. Some argue that neither wage levels nor household 
composition should influence benefit rules. However, benefit adequacy 
studies show that low-wage workers and those with dependents suffer 
the greatest reductions in consumer expenditure when becoming 
unemployed. About one-quarter of the states provide additional bene 
fits per dependent up to a certain limit, and several states provide mini 
mum weekly benefits that exceed 50 percent wage replacement for 
low-wage workers. There is no real consensus on these aspects of ben 
efit adequacy. However, these seem to be relatively low-cost areas 
where the social demands outweigh the insurance principles guiding 
the system.
Inadequacies and excesses occur with a wage-related benefit, 
regardless of what test of adequacy is applied. Benefits replace a por 
tion of wages lost through unemployment, independent of the impor 
tance those wages have in the individual or in the family budget. For 
the wage earner with heavy family responsibilities, unemployment 
benefits often cover only a small portion of essential expenses. Pre 
cisely the same benefit amount may cover not only necessities, but also 
many incidentals, for a single wage earner, a worker with substantial 
income from investment or properties, or the member of a family with 
multiple wage earners.
The uneven results are inherent in a wage-related benefit that is not 
keyed to individual worker or family need. However, to criticize the 
benefit as inadequate or excessive in terms of meeting any particular 
individual's or family's circumstances is to ignore the objective of the 
program. The requirements UI addresses are not those of individual
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claimants, but the presumed need of all workers who become unem 
ployed—for some degree of income replacement.
The program is not designed to relieve poverty. Such relief presup 
poses a means test to ensure the individual is indeed destitute and 
offers a benefit keyed to the individual's needs. Instead, UI seeks to 
prevent poverty, by sustaining, to a "substantial" extent, whatever stan 
dard of living the insured worker's former wage provided—until he or 
she manages to get back to work.
UI beneficiaries are not poor. They have significant attachment to 
the labor force and represent all income categories. The program has 
been criticized by some who contend that tax dollars should be limited 
to helping only those who are truly in need. The principal purpose of 
UI, however, is to prevent unemployed workers from descending into 
poverty before they can find suitable employment. The program thus 
seeks to prevent both drastic reductions in unemployed workers' living 
standards and further damage to their self respect and confidence. 
These are realistic and desirable goals. Like preventative medicine, UI 
can help avoid considerable welfare and psychological costs.
NOTES
This chapter incorporates previous work done by Murray Rubin. My work on this chapter ben 
efited from valuable suggestions and guidance from Ronald Oaxaca, Michael Ransom, Paul Bur 
gess, Stephen Woodbury, and Kenneth Klme. Insightful comments were offered by conference 
discussant Robert St. Louis Claire Black and Ellen Maloney provided clerical support. Remain 
ing errors are mine alone
1. Sections 3304(a)(4), (h), Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA); section 303(a)(5), Social 
Security Act (SSA).
2. Hoar (1934, p 26) writes that the 1934 Wisconsin law called for benefits to be "half the 
average weekly wage, but not less than $5, nor more than $10."
3 Raushenbush and Raushenbush (1979, chapter 2) discuss the evolution of the Wisconsin 
law and the influence of the earlier workers' compensation law enacted by Wisconsin in 1911.
4. It is reported quarterly by the U.S. Department of Labor in UI Data Summary and annually 
in updates to UI Financial Data, ET Handbook No 394.
5. Under certain assumptions, this calculation could be done using sample data from the ran 
dom audit benefits quality control program. Computation of the replacement rate recommended 
by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation would impose a significant data pro 
cessing burden on states. The process would involve weekly computations based on individual 
records
6 Grossman considers the primary market worker in a household to be the one with the high 
est annual earnings, he labels other members with earnings as secondary market workers (Gross 
man 1973, p 208)
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7. Simulated levels of UI earnings replacement in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data 
used by Gruber averaged around 50 percent. Relative risk aversion is the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income with respect to income.
8. The full compensation triangle depicted in figure 5.3 is simply a two-dimensional represen 
tation of the quantity (Y - Y 1 ) represented by a vertical line in figure 5.2 Hurd (1980, p 227-228) 
gives a full exposition of this idea.
9 The estimate is achieved by taking a second-order Taylor Series approximation of the dif 
ference between the exogenous cost of achieving the unconstrained utility level in the presence of 
the ration and the cost of achieving the same level in the absence of any constraint, around the 
fully employed point. The result is "a conventional Harberger (1971) type triangle measure of 
welfare loss" (Ashenfelter 1980, p. 553), which is applied to aggregate time series data
10. Hurd (1980) estimated the parameters of a Taylor Series approximation of the substitution 
effect of a wage change on hours of work, integrated to find the compensated labor supply func 
tion, and then solved for the utility constant wage acceptance locus by inversion.
11. The results in O'Leary (1996) based on the Stone-Geary specification of utility are much 
more plausible than those based on a linear labor supply specification such as that used by Hurd 
(1980). It may be that the greater flexibility of the Stone-Geary form more fully captures underly 
ing behavior.
12. This potentially long lag in how earnings influence benefits has not gone unnoticed by 
employers whose experience-rated tax liability can be shifted by specific short-term employment 
patterns.
13 Public Law 98-369, approved July 18, 1984. Michigan will soon switch from a wage 
request to a wage reporting state and simultaneously switch from an average weekly wage benefit 
computation to a high-quarter formula
14. The 4.4 percent rate applies in Alaska, which creatively deals with a large population hav 
ing a highly seasonal income pattern.
15 Steady reduction in the fraction at the maximum weekly UI benefit amount was achieved 
in the 1985-to-1995 period in Alabama, Florida, New York, Ohio, and Texas, which currently 
adjust the maximum by legislative discretion, and in Colorado, Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, and 
Washington.
16. Even for states where the maximum weekly benefit amount is set by law to be a fraction of 
the average weekly wage in the state, the ratio of maximum weekly benefit amount to the average 
weekly wage may not appear to conform with the statute because of differences in the period over 
which state-covered wages are averaged and the date the adjustment is to be made. In table 5.2, 
there are thirty-three states indicted as having a statute for annually adjusting the maximum 
weekly benefit amount Among these states, the most popular type of formula calls for averaging 
wages in the previous calendar year and adjusting the maximum in July. The figures in table 5 2 
involve the maximum weekly benefit amount as of January 1996 and the average weekly wage in 
state Ul-covered employment in calendar year 1995
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